



City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1344,
No. 89-1671 (Apr. 1, 1991).
Court Rejects Conspiracy Exemption
To City's Federal Antitrust Immunity
Columbia Outdoor Advertising
(COA), a billboard company with 95%
of the market in Columbia, South
Carolina and close ties to local political
leaders, was accused by a competitor of
violating federal antitrust law. The plain-
tiff contended that the local regulators
and its competitor had conspired to
enact zoning and other restrictions to
favor the existing company and inhibit
competition. After trial, a jury trial
found such a conspiracy and awarded $1
million in damages, before trebling. The
trial court granted COA's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
on grounds that its activities were out-
side the scope of the federal antitrust
laws. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and reinstated the ver-
dict.
The Supreme Court reversed and
invalidated the jury award, holding that
two separate doctrines provide immunity
for the conduct. First, the Court noted
that "state action" immunity from feder-
al antitrust scrutiny under Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), allows
local government to engage in anticom-
petitive conduct where authorized by
state law and subject to independent
state supervision. The Court declined to
establish a "conspiracy" exception to
regulatory immunity, arguing that such
an exception could "swallow the rule"
since local regulators must choose a pol-
icy option advanced by some propo-
nent-who then may be alleged to be a
conspirator. The Court also declined to
recognize such an exception even where
such a conspiracy is believed to be the
product of a corrupt relationship, since
"virtually all anticompetitive regulation
is open to such charges." The Court
opined that the risk of post facto judicial
assessment would "impair the states'
ability to regulate their domestic com-
merce."
The Court also held that he private
defendant was protected in its advocacy
to the public regulators by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. This doctrine
allows competitors to join together and
restrain trade where such restraints con-
sist of advocacy to public agencies
designed to influence official acts; as
such, they are protected by first amend-
ment freedom of petition rights. The
Court has recognized a "sham" excep-
tion to this immunity, one found to exist
here by the Fourth Circuit. Defendants
are not entitled to claim free speech
immunity where they use the regulatory
forum in bad faith as a device to accom-
plish anticompetitive purposes.
However, the Supreme Court held that
there is "sham" only where the defen-
dant uses the regulatory process itself,
not the outcome of the process, as a way
of restraining trade. For example, where
a defendant routinely files objections
with regulatory agencies merely to
require a competitor to pay the costs of a
hearing, or the defendant uses the regu-
latory process to delay a competitor,
there may be a "sham" use of political
advocacy and liability may be found.
However, the Court held that a "sham"
claim may not be based on an adverse
outcome from such advocacy. The Court
also rejected a "conspiracy" or corrup-
tion exception to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine for the same reasons as given
for rejecting it as applied to the state
action doctrine.
The decision is subject to a vigorous
and persuasive dissent by Justices
Stevens, White, and Marshall. The dis-
sent notes that the majority opinion cate-
gorically precludes inquiry into the
nature of private-public official dealings
because of the possibility that "innocent
municipal officials may be harassed with
baseless charges. The olding evidences
an unfortunate lack of confidence in our
judicial system and will foster the evils
the Sherman Act was designed to eradi-
cate." The dissent notes that the courts
are the primary check on private abuse,
and that private abuse which has corrup-
tively captured a public agency is no less
in need of such a check. The dissent
argues that to categorically preclude
inquiry and remedy because of possible
false charges is to allow unchecked
abuse by institutions. The speculative
possibility that groundless charges may
discourage maximum latitude in regula-
tory discretion is hardly a reasonable
rationale for carving out an impregnable
area of immunity for harmful public
abuse.
The regrettable decision in City of
Columbia is a continuation of a line of
cases conferring judicial deference to
their public official peers in the regulato-
ry sector. The impact of these cases is
momentous: local and state regulators
have the power to award contracts,
licenses, and exclusive franchises worth
many millions of dollars. In terms of
unfair competition, public/private inter-
face arguably requires more examination
than private conduct alone. For the for-
mer, market check may be inherently
precluded. Judicial abdication of review
of possible abuses is extended here to a
categorical exclusion from inquiry or
remedy, whatever the facts. For a discus-
sion of the corruptive impact of such a
policy, see Fellmeth, Regulation by
Local Government-A Case Study of
Monopoly, State Nonfeasance and
Promised Corruption, 3:1 Cal. Reg. L.
Rep. (Winter 1983) at 3.
McCormick v. United States,
U.S.__ ,1S.Ct. 1807,
No. 89-1918 (May 23, 1991).
Hobbs Act Allegation Requires
Proof of Quid Pro Quo
A West Virginia legislator agreed to
carry a bill enabling foreign medical
graduates to practice medicine based on
their years of practice, notwithstanding
their inability to pass medical licensing
examinations. Before the bill was intro-
duced, however, the legislator told the
lobbyist for the affected practitioners
that "his campaign was expensive, that
he had paid considerable sums out of his
own pocket, and that he had not heard
anything from the foreign doctors."
Shortly thereafter, about $3,000 in cash
was given by the practitioners and deliv-
ered by their lobbyist to the legislator.
The cash payments were not reported as
campaign contributions. The legislator
introduced the bill, spoke for it, and it
was enacted. Another cash contribution
was received after enactment.
Following an investigation, a federal
grand jury returned an indictment charg-
ing the legislator with five counts of vio-
lating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. section
1951, by extorting payments under color
of official right, and several other
counts. A jury convicted the legislator
on one of the Hobbs Act counts. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed. The
Court found the trial court's jury instruc-
tions insufficient in that they failed to
distinguish between payments which
could have been campaign contributions,
and payments that are illegal under the
Hobbs Act. Although the jury was
instructed that extortion does not occur
"where a public official receives a...vol-
untary political contribution," and that
"voluntary" means "that which is freely
given without expectation of benefit,"
the instruction was deemed insufficient.
The Court noted with sympathy that
"[s]erving constituents and supporting
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legislation that will benefit [them] is the
everyday business of a legislator. It is
also true that campaigns must be run
and financed." The Court concluded that
soliciting contributions and doing favors
for those who contribute is unavoidable
conduct and "well within the law."
Rather, a Hobbs Act violation requires
that the payments are made "in return
for an explicit promise or undertaking
by the official to perform or not to per-
form an official act. In such situations
the official asserts that his official con-
duct will be controlled by the terms of
the promise or undertaking... .This for-
mulation defines the forbidden zone of
conduct with sufficient clarity."
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, dissented,
arguing that the crime consisted of solic-
iting and accepting cash "pursuant to an
understanding" that an earlier threat not
to proceed with the legislation would be
thereby ameliorated. The dissenters stat-
ed that acceptance of the money under
these circumstances established the req-
uisite quid pro quo, and factual exami-
nation of and relevant instructions con-
cerning subsequent behavior are irrele-
vant.
Interestingly, both the majority and
dissenting opinions believe that a quid
pro quo intent is a necessary element of
the offense. The significance of this case
does not rest in its analysis of the stan-
dard, but in its implications about proof
necessary to support a finding of intent
to solicit monies through the use of offi-
cial acts or forebearance. Most corrup-
tion is not achieved by explicit contract,
but is communicated by a pattern of
behavior or indirect message. It has
been the law that if the trier of fact
believes that the money is buying the act
or the act is controlled by the money, a
violation is established. To the extent
the Court is implying that confessory
admissions must be made in the form of
money for performance contracts, the
prohibition is rendered nugatory.
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS
Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada (Lawyers
Title Insurance Corporation, et al.,
Real Parties in Interest),
934 F.2d 209, 91 D.A.R. 6114,
No. 90-70418 (May 24, 1991).
'Qui Tam' Plaintiffs Are Not
Required to Answer Third-Party
Complaints
In this proceeding, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals was presented with "a
significant question of first impression":
whether a qui tam plaintiff in a False
Claims Act (FCA) action should be
required to answer counterclaims or be
liable to third-party complainants for
indemnification and/or contribution. The
underlying action involved Mortgages,
Inc., a mortgage lending company. In
1983, Mortgages accepted from real par-
ties various applications for loans
insured by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD); the
applications allegedly contained false
and misleading statements. Following
default on the loans, HUD was required
to cover several million dollars in loss-
es; Mortgages entered into a settlement
with the government under which
Mortgages agreed to indemnify the gov-
ernment $437,000.
In 1988, Mortgages instituted an
action under the FCA, 31 U.S.C. section
3279 et seq., revealing information
regarding real parties' allegedly false
statements contained in the applications.
The United States elected to proceed
with the action, making Mortgages a qui
tam plaintiff. Real parties then filed
third-party complaints against
Mortgages, seeking full indemnification
and/or contribution from Mortgages
against any recovery or judgment in
favor of the United States in the FCA
action. The district court denied
Mortgages' motion to dismiss the third-
party complaints; Mortgages then filed a
petition for writ of mandamus with the
Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the FCA
does not address the right of contribu-
tion or indemnification. Further, the
court determined that nothing in the leg-
islative history of the FCA mentions
contribution or indemnification, and that
"the framers of the Act recognized that
wrongdoers might be rewarded under
the Act, acknowledging the qui tam pro-
visions are based upon the idea of 'set-
ting a rogue to catch a rogue."' The
court stated that the FCA "in no way
intended to ameliorate the liability of
wrongdoers by providing defendants
with a remedy against a qui tam plaintiff
with 'unclean hands."' The court also
determined that because Congress has
enacted a comprehensive legislative
scheme, courts are prevented from for-
mulating federal common law in this
area. Interestingly, the court noted that
nothing in the Act prevents the govern-
ment from naming the qui tam plaintiff
as a defendant, if that would be appro-
priate.
Because the court found no basis in
the FCA or federal common law to pro-
vide a right to contribution and/or
indemnification in a FCA proceeding,
the court concluded that there can be no
right to assert counterclaims seeking
such a result. Therefore, the court grant-
ed Mortgages' petition for writ of man-
damus and ordered the district court to
vacate its order requiring Mortgages to




53 Cal. 3d, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528
No. SO 14500 (May 39, 1991).
Defendant's Actual or Constructive
Knowledge of Danger Must Be Proven
in Strict Liability Case Based
on Failure to Warn
Defendant manufactures products
containing asbestos, and plaintiff con-
tracted asbestosis through exposure to
defendant's products while working in
the Long Beach Naval Shipyard from
1941 to 1976. Proceeding in pertinent
part on a "failure to warn" theory, plain-
tiff alleged a cause of action for strict
tort liability. Defendant asserted that its
failure to warn was justified since the
hazard was not known based on state-of-
the-art scientific evidence available at
the time. The Second District Court of
Appeal held that in a strict product lia-
bility case, including a "failure to warn"
case, "state of the art evidence is not
admissible since it focuses on the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's conduct,
which is irrelevant in strict liability."
The California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "strict
liability.. .was never intended to make
the manufacturer or distributor of a
product its insurer." In Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413 (1978),
the court held that a strict product liabil-
ity case based upon a design defect may
be established by either one of two tests:"whether the product performed as safe-
ly as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended and
reasonably foreseeable manner," and the
troublesome alternative test-"whether
on balance the benefits of the challenged
design outweighed the risk of danger
inherent in the design." In Barker, the
court also noted the third type of defect,
inadequacy of warning, but did not
address the issue since it was not neces-
sary to the issues on appeal.
Squarely presented with this issue in
Anderson, the court took the opportunity
to reaffirm and expand its holding in
Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d
1049 (1988), holding that "knowledge,
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actual or constructive, is a requisite for
strict liability for failure to warn...."
Legislature v. Eu,
No. S019660 (Mar. 27, 1991).
State Supreme Court to Hear
Challenge to Proposition 140
On March 27, the California
Supreme Court agreed to hear
Legislature v. Eu, the constitutional
challenge to Proposition 140 brought by
the legislature and several individuals
and legislators. Proposition 140 is the
term limitation initiative approved by
voters in November 1990. (See CRLR
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 1991) p. 35 for
background information.) All seven jus-
tices signed the order and instructed
attorneys to file briefs by May 1, but no
date was set for oral argument.
Represented by San Francisco attor-
ney Joe Remcho, plaintiffs challenge the
validity of Proposition 140 on several
grounds, including the following: (1) its
term limit provisions are fundamental
revisions to the state constitution which
are properly made through a special
constitutional hearing process-not by
way of a mere constitutional amendment
in a citizens' initiative; (2) Proposition
140's inclusion of provisions on term
limits for legislators, a 38% cut in the
legislature's operating budget, and elim-
ination of the legislature's pension plan
violates the single-subject rule; and (3)
the initiative violates the right of self-
determination in that it has allowed vot-
ers in one part of the state to determine
who may not represent voters in other
parts of the state. (See supra reports on
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENER-
AL, and OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST for related discussion.)
Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v.
State Board of Equalization,
53 Cal. 3d 245, 279 Cal. Rptr. 325,
No. S013840 (Apr. 1, 1991).
Tobacco Tax Initiative
Upheld
The California Supreme Court has
upheld the validity of Proposition 99,
the Tobacco Tax and Health Protection
Act of 1988 passed by the California
voters on November 8, 1988. In its
appeal, Kennedy, a distributor of
cigarettes and tobacco products, repeat-
ed the arguments which it had made
to-and which had been rejected
by-the Third District Court of Appeal.
(See CRLR Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter
1990) p. 157 for detailed background
information on the Third District's deci-
sion.) In affirming the appellate court,
the Supreme Court stated that voters
have the power to raise taxes in an ini-
tiative measure, and that this may be
accomplished by a simple majority vote.
The court also found that Proposition 99
complied with the state constitution's
single-subject rule, as all of the initia-
tive's parts are reasonably germane to its
primary stated objective "to reduce the
economic costs of tobacco use in
California."
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Deukmejian,
Cal. 3d , _Cal. Rptr.
No. S020072 (Apr. 25, 1991).
Court Refuses to Review
Proposition 105 Ruling
On April 25, the California Supreme
Court denied respondents' petition for
review in this proceeding, leaving intact
the First District Court of Appeal's
determination that Proposition 105, the
"Public's Right to Know Act" approved
by voters at the November 1988 general
election, violates the single-subject rule
of the state constitution and is therefore
void. (See CRLR Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring




Northwest Financial, Inc. v.
State Board of Equalization and
San Diego County,
229 Cal. App. 3d 198, 280 Cal. Rptr. 24,
No. D011121 (Apr. 10, 1991).
Acquisition Value Taxation System
Does Not Violate Equal Protection
In this proceeding, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal rejected
Northwest Financial's challenge to the
real property "acquisition value" taxa-
tion system established by Proposition
13, which was adopted by the California
voters on June 6, 1978. Northwest
Financial based its challenge on the
grounds that the acquisition value taxa-
tion system violates equal protection
guarantees and infringes upon the con-
stitutional right to travel. Regarding the
equal protection challenge, the court
reasoned that a system which creates
classifications based on value at the time
of purchase need not result in uniform
tax rates for all taxpayers "since the
classifications have a rational basis
related to a legitimate state purpose. In
short, no equal protection violation has
been shown since the alleged disparity
arises from a rationally based classifica-
tion system, rather than from different
treatment of those within the same clas-
sification."
The Fourth District similarly rejected
plaintiff's arguments that Proposition 13
infringes on the constitutional right to
travel by noting that the acquisition
value taxation system "differentiates
between property purchasers, regardless
of their residency. Both longtime resi-
dents, new residents, and nonresidents
are subject to the same 'acquisition
value' system...." The court even went
on to opine that because Proposition 13
"carries the benefit of predictability of
future tax bills," its provisions "could
encourage travel more than the former
current value system which had no such
predictability."
In rejecting Northwest Financial's
challenge to Proposition 13, the Fourth
District became the third appellate court
to uphold the initiative in the past six
months. The other two cases have
already moved to the U.S. Supreme
Court. On June 3, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to review the constitution-
ality of Proposition 13 in R.H. Macy &
Co. v. Contra Costa County, No. 90-
1603. However, only four days later,
Macy's abruptly abandoned its chal-
lenge, claiming that a court opinion
might extend beyond commercial real
estate property taxes to include residen-
tial tax issues. [Macy's had been threat-
ened with a consumer boycott of its
stores by Richard Gann, son of the late
Paul Gann; and had been harshly criti-
cized by the business community, which
claimed that a Macy's win in court
would mean massive property tax
hikes.] Although it dodged that bullet,
Proposition 13 is not completely safe;
the U.S. Supreme Court is currently
reviewing Nordlinger v. Lynch, a peti-
tion for certiorari filed by residential
homeowners challenging the validity of
the initiative. (See supra report on CEN-
TER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST; see also CRLR Vol. 11, No.
2 (Spring 1991) p. 28 and Vol. 11, No. 1
(Winter 1991) pp. 23 and 156 for back-
ground information.)
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State Board of Control v. Superior
Court of Sacramento County
(San Jose Mercury News,
Real Party in Interest),
228 Cal.App.3d 1188,
279 Cal. Rptr. 413,
No. C009882 (Mar. 26, 1991).
Statute Preventing Appellate Review
of Public Records Cases Invalidated
In this proceeding, the Third District
Court of Appeal ruled that because part
of Government Code section 6259(c)
prohibits review by appeal of cases aris-
ing under the Public Records Act,
Government Code section 6250 et seq.,
the provision "conflicts with and is
thereby invalidated by the express grant
of the appellate jurisdiction in article VI,
section 11, of the California Constitu-
tion, which provides: "[C]ourts of
appeal have appellate jurisdiction when
superior courts have original jurisdiction
and in other causes prescribed by
statute."'
The Public Records Act creates a
statutory right of public access to infor-
mation concerning the conduct of the
People's business and defines the public
records subject o disclosure; to enforce
this right, the Act authorizes a proceed-
ing in superior court to compel the dis-
closure of records which it defines as
public.. However, section 6259(c)
declares that the order of the superior
court "is not a final judgment or
order...from which an appeal may be
taken" and provides for discretionary
appellate review by petition to the
appellate court for the issuance of an
extraordinary writ of review.
The court found that review of a
decision made pursuant to the Public
Records Act is the kind of case over
which the superior courts have by
statute been given original jurisdiction;
therefore, appeals of such cases are gov-
erned by article VI, section 11 of the
state constitution. Further, the court
noted that "if the right of appeal is con-
stitutionally granted in any given case
such right cannot be destroyed or delim-
ited by legislative enactment." The court
thus concluded that "[s]ince the first
sentence of subdivision (c) of section
6259 forbids an appeal in all public
records act cases it is void as in conflict
with the grant of appellate jurisdiction
in article VI, section II of the California
Constitution."
On May 23, the California Supreme
Court granted respondent's petition for
review in this proceeding; at this writ-
ing, no briefing schedule has been
announced.
County of Fresno v. Lehman, et al.,
229 Cal. App. 3d 340,
280 Cal. Rptr. 310,
No. F013637 (Apr. 17, 1991).
Private Attorney General Law
Is Not State-Mandated Program
In Sequoia Community Health
Foundation, etc. v. Board of Supervisors
of Fresno County, et al., No. 269458-7
(Fresno County Superior Court), the
County of Fresno was ordered to pay
attorneys' fees in the amount of $88,120
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1021.5, the "private attorney gener-
al" attorneys' fees statute. The County
contended that it is entitled to reim-
bursement of that amount from the state
by alleging that the expenditure arose
out of a state-mandated new program or
higher level of service pursuant to arti-
cle XIIIB, section 6 of the California
Constitution, which generally requires
the state to reimburse local governments
for the costs of such programs or ser-
vices.
According to the Fifth District, "[tihe
intent underlying article XIIIB, section 6
was to require reimbursement to local
agencies for the costs involved in carry-
ing out functions peculiar to govern-
ment, not for expenses incurred by local
agencies as an incidental impact of laws
that apply generally to all state residents
and entities." The court noted that the
reimbursements envisioned in article
XIIIB, section 6 are for expenses or
increased costs of programs adminis-
tered locally, and found that it "would
be tortuous to interpret Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5 as a program
administered locally. A more logical
interpretation is to view the expenses
incurred therewith as an 'incidental
impact' of existing law." Thus, the court
concluded that section 1021.5 is not a
state-mandated program as interpreted
by article XIIIB, section 6.
Committee to Defend ReproductiVe
Rights, et al.,
v. A Free Pregnancy Center, et al.,
229 Cal.App. 3d 633, 280 Cal.Rptr. 329,
No. A046189 (Apr. 23, 1991).
Denial of Fees to Private Attorneys
in Public/Private Trial Justifies Remand
In 1986, appellant Committee and
others initiated an action against respon-
dents based primarily on respondents'
alleged violation of the unfair business
practices statutes, Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq.
Four months after appellants filed their
initial complaint, the San Francisco
District Attorney filed a similar action,
seeking injunctive relief and civil dam-
ages for respondents' alleged unfair
business practices. Appellants' lawsuit,
which involved a cause of action and
defendants not contained in the District
Attorney's complaint, was consolidated
with the public suit. Following a six-
week trial, the court issued its judgment
against respondents. However, the court
denied appellants' request for attorneys'
fees, finding that their suit was not "nec-
essary" as that term is defined in Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
The First District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded, holding that an
attorneys' fee award in such a case is
dependent upon an ultimate finding that
the "colitigating party rendered neces-
sary and significant services of value to
the public or to a large class of persons
benefitted by the result of the litigation."
Further, the court determined that the
trial court construed the necessity
requirement of section 1021.5 too nar-
rowly, and that appellants are not pro-
hibited from receiving attorneys' fees
simply because the government subse-
quently filed a similar suit. In remand-
ing the action to the trial court, the First
District acknowledged that trial courts
"must carefully walk the line between
unreasonably transmuting section
1021.5 into an unwarranted cornucopia
of attorney fees for those who intervene
in, or initiate litigation against, private
parties under the guise of benefiting the
public interest while actually performing
duplicative, unnecessary, and valueless
services; and providing appropriate
compensation under that statute in cases
where the colitigating private party does
render necessary, significant services of
value and benefit the public."
a
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